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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WAIVER or JuRY TRIAL IN FELoNY CASEs.-De-
fendants were charged with a conspiracy to bribe a Federal officer, this
crime being punishable by imprisonment in the Federal penitentiary for a
term of years. During the trial one of the jurors became so seriously ill
that he could not continue to serve. Defendants, defendants' counsel and
government counsel assented to continue with eleven jurors, who found
defendants guilty. There is no Federal statute authorizing waiver of
jury trial in criminal cases. Upon writ of error defendants contended that
their waiver of the twelfth juror had been ineffective and that the trial
court had no power to proceed. The Circuit Court of Appeals certified
the question to the Supreme Court. Held, the conviction of the defendants
was valid. Sutherland, J., in the opinion of the court, concurred in by
Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and Butler, held that waiver of one
juror is equivalent to waiver of the entire jury, but that trial by jury may
be waived notwithstanding the Sixth Amendment, which provides that,
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury . . . " Justices Holmes, Brandeis
and Stone concurred only in the result. Justice Sanford "agreed to a dis-
position of the case in accordance with this opinion" but died before the
opinion was approved. Only eight justices participated in the decision, the
Chief Justiceship having been vacant at the time the case was argued.
Patton v. United States (1930) 50 S. Ct. 253.
It is not open to question that for most purposes trial by jury in this
country means trial by a common law jury of twelve men. Thompson .
Utah (1898) 170 U. S. 343. Accordingly those courts which have held
waiver of jury trial to be unconstitutional in criminal cases have refused
to sustain convictions by juries whose membership, by consent of defend-
ants, was less than twelve. Cancemi v. People (1858) 18 N. Y. 128, 137,
138; Branham v. Commonwealth (1925) 209 Ky. 734, 273 S. W. 489; State
v. Hataway (1923) 153 La. 751, 96 So. 556; State v. Sanders (Mo. 1922)
243 S. W. 771.
But the dictum in the principal case, that since all twelve jurors may be
waived, one may be, is unique. It is possible to accept the conclusion with-
out subscribing to the premise. That is what three of the judges seem to
have deemed it wise to do. Granting that a common law jury is dispensed
with whether the waiver be of one juror or of twelve, and that the con-
stitutional issue is the same in both cases, it may still be contended that
twelve jurors can be waived only by authority of a statute whereas one may
be dispensed with in the absence of statute. No waiver of jury by the de-
fendant can give to the trial judge power to decide facts. Only the jury
has this power, and jurisdiction cannot be vested in a judge alone by mere
consent of a defendant. Michaelson v. Beemer (1904) 72 Neb., 761, 101
N. W. 1007; People v. Harris (1889) 128 Ill. 585, 21 N. E. 563; State v.
Smith (1924) 184 Wis. 664, 200 N. W. 638. Mr. Justice Sutherland holds
in the principal case that this distinction is unreal.
What the principal case decides, then, is that in a felony trial in a Fed-
eral court the presence of one or more jurors may be waived by the de-
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fondant. Undoubtedly an act of Congress authorizing such waiver would
be constitutional. But the Supreme Court has not decided that in the absence
of a statute the presence of a jury can be dispensed with or even that a
statute authorizing such procedure would conform to the Sixth Amend-
ment. On these points the principal case adds only dicta to which four
justices have subscribed. Earlier decisions are reviewed in Aronson,
Waiver of a Jury in Felony Cases in Missouri (1928) 14 ST. Louis L. REV.
34.
Still the case represents a significant development in the solution of an
important constitutional question. It shows which way the wind is blow-
ing, even though the decision may be somewhat surprising to those indi-
viduals, who, like the early courts, believe that the institution of trial by
jury was God-given and that it could not be waived even by those for
whose protection it was made into a constitutional right. N. F. D., '31.
CORPORATIONS--BONDS--EXERCISE OF CONVERSION PRIVILEGE IN CALLABLE
BONDS.-Because of the stringency of the money market in recent years,
corporations have been forced to issue bonds at extremely high interest
rates. The practice has grown of inserting a redemption privilege, thus
enabling corporations to call in their bonds when it becomes possible to
float another issue at lower rates. Some bonds of this type also give the
holder the privilege of converting to bonds of a different series at a dif-
ferent rate of interest. In Brookes and Co. v. North Carolina Public Serv-
ice Co. (C. C. A. 4, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 220, a case of first impression, a cor-
poration issued seven per cent bonds convertible at par to six per cent
bonds at 92. Both series could be called in before maturity upon the cor-
poration's publishing notice for four successive weeks. The corporation
published the first notice of its intention to call in both series-the one at
103 and the other at 105. A holder immediately presented his seven per
cent bonds for conversion to the six per cent series, intending to present
bonds of the six per cent series for redemption. By this simple manipula-
tion, he expected to realize $11.13 on each bond converted since he would
receive 100 six per cent bonds redeemable at 105 for only 92 seven per cent
bonds which were redeemable at 103. The corporation refused. The court,
in an action by the holder for this unrealized profit, held that a conversion
privilege in redeemable or callable bonds terminates as soon as the first
notice to redeem is published, and accordingly found for the defendant.
The district court had previously reached the same result on the ground
of waiver of his rights by the plaintiff, but expressed the view that the
corporation was liable in damages for refusal to convert on demand before
the expiration of the period of notice. The court cited cases upholding the
validity of conversion privileges: Chaffee v. Middlessex R. R. Co. (1888)
146 Mass. 224, 16 N. E. 34; Bratten v. Catawissa Ry. Co. (1905) 211 Pa.
21, 60 Atl. 319; John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Worcester R. R.
Co. (1889) 149 Mass. 214, 21 N. E. 364; 33 Cyc. 453. None of these cases
involved bonds of the callable variety, however.
The Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the call privilege must be con-
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